President Bush's pronouncement that he would wage a crusade against terrorism has
sent waves of concern and even anger in the Muslim World. President Bush and his aides
claimed that it was a slip of the tongue and what Bush really meant to say was a
"broad cause" against terrorism. If this is true, then it is even more
frightening. Is the idea of a crusade so strongly embedded in George W. Bush's
subconscious that it would slip out so easily?
Whether Bush is thinking in terms of a crusade, his use
of the term has done considerable damage to his efforts to build a global coalition in his
"broad cause" against a multinational network of terrorists. Not only are many
Muslims upset and angry at Bush's use of the term, they are now determined not to join him
in his war against Muslims. Moreover, they are responding to this comment by
wondering if Osama Bin Laden has been right all along; that the US is an enemy of Islam
and will use any and every opportunity to destroy it. How different, they wonder, is
Bush's call for a global crusade from Bin Laden's call for a global jihad?
Insensitive and jingoistic diplomacy is the first threat to the international consensus
that Bush must construct meticulously to make his plan work.
There are other challenges to this potential global alliance against terror. These
challenges are of two types; those that would preclude the creation of an effective
alliance, and those that will undermine its stability and longevity.
The formative challenges will essentially entail the aligning of the national interests of
diverse nations with those of the United States. This is not an easy task since some of
the key players whose cooperation is imperative, such as Pakistan, Iran and Syria, have
had adversarial relations with the US in the recent past. All these states currently have
US sanctions imposed against them that have prevented them from pursuing their own
legitimate national interests.
US sanctions against Iran punish it for eliminating the enemies of Iran overseas. Now the
US seeks Iranian cooperation to do the same. US sanctions have been placed against Syria
for its support of Hezbollah, an organization which successfully drove Israel out of
Lebanon and the Golan Heights. US sanctions against Pakistan were imposed due to its
pursuit of nuclear and ballistic technology, which was a necessary tool in balancing
India, an emerging adversarial regional power.
The US has actively undermined the national interests of
these states, and now hopes that overnight these states will align their interests with
those of the US. This seems a bit unlikely, unless the US makes it worth their
while. It does however raise another question. How far will the US accommodate the needs
of other states to ensure their consistent cooperation?
Will the US drop the sanctions against Pakistan? Will Iran and Syria get off the list of
states that sponsor terrorists? After all, how can the US allies against terror also be on
US list of state sponsors of terrorism? How will Israel and more importantly the powerful
Israeli lobby in the US respond to this realignment and restructuring of the geopolitical
terrain in the Middle East?
Demanding the full support of Pakistan, which includes access to intelligence, surrogate
diplomacy, and permission to use its air space and bases to launch an attack against
Afghanistan if necessary, will require more than loan guarantees and lifting of sanctions.
Pakistan risks widespread discontent, split in the military establishment, a refugee
crisis and even an Islamist uprising by meeting US demands. First and foremost, the US
will have to convince Pakistan that they will not abandon it or ignore their legitimate
national interests.
Is the US ready to make such a promise to Pakistan? More importantly, can it fulfill
such a promise? Will the US look the other way if in the future Pakistan acquires advanced
military technology from China? Or even better, will the US replace China as the guarantor
of Pakistan's technological balance of power with India? Pakistan will surely seek an
increased US participation in their dispute with India over Kashmir. So far the US has
maintained a safe distance from this potentially Palestine-like scenario. This may change
given the criticality of Pakistan's cooperation in the initial US response and its future
assaults on anti-US elements in the region.
The second phase of the US war on terror entails the
systematic identification and elimination of the so-called terror infrastructure. The
project to begin with seems very dubious. The US is taking the word of its intelligence
community and Israeli authorities about the existence of this invisible empire. We must be
cautious. These same sources were clueless about the horrific attacks that took place on
Sept. 11th. Now these same sources wax ad nausea about the extent, depth and scope of the
perpetrators' assets.
Nevertheless, to be successful in the second phase, the US will have to enjoy a great deal
of confidence and cooperation from Arab regimes. If the second phase follows a massive
attack on Afghanistan resulting in the deaths of many innocent civilians, then Arab
support may not be forthcoming. There might very well be a danger to the stability of the
regimes whose popularity will diminish in direct proportion to their cooperation with the
US, especially if Bush continues to make Freudian slips.
One thing is for sure. If the US continues to support, arm and finance the terror that
Israeli military frequently unleashes against Palestinians, the Arab regimes will not
cooperate. It was only a month ago that they chose to scuttle the prospects of the
racism conference rather than defer to US demands to compromise on their stance on Israel.
This leads us to the most fundamental question - is the US willing to reconsider its
uncritical support for Israel to ensure the realization of its own national interests and
national security?
Bush's global war on terrorism requires a global alliance. It will entail the
restructuring of many existing geopolitical equations. Can this administration muster the
diplomatic finesse and the domestic political consensus it will take?